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Is God Good? Aquinas, Śaṃkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese 
Śaivism, and the Problematics of the Argument from Evil 
Lance E. Nelson 
University of San Diego 
 
I have long thought that comparative theology 
could make important contributions to the 
perennial discussion of “the problem of evil,” or 
more specifically in the present case, the 
modern “argument from evil.”1 As an argument 
against the existence of God, the latter was first 
forcefully articulated by philosophers of the 
Enlightenment.2 As is well known, however, its 
importance continues to the present day. It has 
long been considered “the most powerful 
objection to traditional theism.”3 
The problem of evil—as opposed to the 
argument from evil—is an ancient one, but it 
was not initially formulated as an argument in 
support of atheism. God’s existence was taken 
for granted, and on that basis thinkers like 
Augustine engaged an serious intellectual 
struggle with deep questions about the divine 
raised by the presence of evil in the world: the 
unicity of God, the knowability of God, the 
possibility of Divine providence.4  The atheist 
argument from evil—especially as expounded of 
late by the New Atheists--tends to reduce this 
history to a caricature. 
The question of God’s goodness is what I 
want to focus on in this paper. What exactly 
“good” means in this context is often 
extraordinarily ambiguous. Nevertheless, the 
assumed meaning nowadays seems to be that 
God is morally good. Richard Dawkins, in his book 
The God Delusion, remarks, “It is childishly easy to 
overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate 
a nasty god.”5 Must the God of monotheism 
therefore necessarily be a “nice” God, as 
Dawkins seems to imply?6 One problem with this 
formulation is that it takes for granted that God 
is a moral agent that can be judged, and found 
wanting, by the same sort of external standards 
that we apply in judging other human beings. Is 
this uniformly the case in the Christian 
tradition? What about thinkers and myth-
makers in other religious traditions? 
In exploring a small aspect of this question 
here, I will be working with Aquinas, Śaṃkara 
and the Advaita tradition, and Abhinavagupta 
and the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir. I will also 
refer briefly to Balinese Hinduism, an 
interesting expression of pre-Abhinava Śaivism.   
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Aquinas—though he has a lot to day about 
God, good, and evil—does not seriously engage 
the atheist argument from evil. Śaṃkara was 
aware of the challenge of atheism, and he does 
offer a theodicy, but it is a preliminary one, not 
representing his final view. Abhinavagupta and 
his tradition, in terms of theological discourse, 
have scarcely anything to say on evil as it might 
problematize conceptions of God, for it seems to 
them not a problem, though the Śaiva mythic 
corpus speaks in its own way. For Hindus in Bali, 
the idea that God is good is taken to be 
simplistic. 
To be clear, my concern here is not any 
solution to the problem of evil as such, but 
rather the prior question of God’s goodness. In 
particular, I’m interested in whether or not God 
is properly considered to be morally good in a 
way that the modern argument from evil 
assumes that God, if God exists, must necessarily 
be.7 My basic proposition is that, for the writers 
and ways of thought I’m looking at, God is 
precisely not morally good, in the sense that any 
moral standards we use in judging our fellow 
human beings are not properly applied to God. 
It should be, I hope, obvious that this does not 
mean that these traditions think of God as 
immoral; for these writers God is—in a word—
transmoral. 
Aquinas 
As it happens, Aquinas offers what Hickson 
suggests is an early prototype of the argument 
from evil.8 Prior to this occurrence, Hickson can 
identify no discussion of evil aimed directly at 
disproving the existence of God (as opposed to 
provoking reflection on the unity or knowability 
of God or gods, or divine providence, or such 
questions). But Hickson is not at all sure that 
Aquinas took this argument seriously. He thinks, 
rather, that it was included as a prima facie view, 
according to the Aristotelian-Scholastic formula 
for such disputations, which required an initial 
statement of objection.9 In any event, here it is: 
It seems that there is no God. For if one of 
two contraries were infinite, the other 
would be completely destroyed. But by the 
word 'God' we understand a certain infinite 
good. So, if God existed, nobody would ever 
encounter evil. But we do encounter evil in 
the world. So, God does not exist. (Summa 
Theologiae 1a.2.3)10 
We do not have space to dwell on this 
example here. Neither, it seems, did Aquinas. As 
Hickson points out, Aquinas dispatched it in two 
sentences. But let us note in passing that this is 
a metaphysical, not a moral argument: there 
cannot be room for two infinite realities that are 
assumed to be contraries. What it specifically 
does not offer as a premise is the supposed moral 
goodness of God. 
I would suggest that one important reason 
for this is that while Aquinas, with the rest of the 
Christian tradition, certainly thinks of God as 
good, he does not define that goodness in moral 
terms. Thus we read: 
The goodness of something consists in its 
being desirable. Hence Aristotle's dictum 
that ‘good is what everything desires’. But 
desirability evidently follows upon 
perfection, for things always desire their 
perfection. (Summa Theologiae Ia.5.1)11 
So goodness is defined in terms of 
desirability and perfection. On that basis, 
Aquinas proceeds to argue for (1) the goodness 
of God, (2) for God as the supreme good, and (3) 
that only God is essentially good—but none of 
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this in terms of God’s morality. The discussion, 
as Stump characterizes it, is meta-ethical.12 
God is certainly the cause of moral goodness 
in his creatures, but he is not himself a being 
that is possessed of moral virtues as humans are 
and that humans can understand. Neither is God 
subject to external moral obligations. As Brian 
Davies argues, Aquinas would consider any 
discussion of the “moral integrity” of God to be 
seriously misplaced.13 Aquinas is certainly aware 
that scripture and tradition have used words 
like “just,” “truthful,” “loving,” “merciful” and, 
yes, “good” in reference to God.14 As is well 
known, however, Aquinas believes such 
attributions are analogical. He does not take 
them to mean that God possesses these qualities 
in anything close to the way in which humans 
do. 
While, like Augustine, Aquinas had a good 
deal to say about God and evil, he had, as Davies 
points out forcefully, pretty much nothing to 
say on “what contemporary philosophers have 
come to call the problem of evil.”15 It would not 
have occurred to him that God’s goodness would 
be a matter of adjudication in terms of standards 
of morality applicable to human beings. Aquinas 
scholar Herbert McCabe puts it dramatically: “It 
is blasphemous nonsense to say that God is 
wicked, but it is equally inappropriate to say 
that he is morally good. . . . Moral good and evil 
belong to rational beings that achieve or fail to 
achieve perfection.”16 
Śaṃkara and the Advaita Tradition 
In querying the goodness of Brahman, the 
ultimate reality in Advaita Vedānta, the first 
word that comes to mind is sat and its cognates, 
sattā and satya. These terms are often used to 
characterize or define Brahman. Sat in some 
contexts can mean “good.” More commonly, 
certainly in Advaita discourse, it would properly 
be translated “truth,” “reality,” or simply 
“existence” or “being,” in a purely ontological 
sense.17 
Śaṃkara’s definition of sat is quite simple: it 
is that which does not change (na vyabhicarati).18 
Alternately, in the standard formulation of the 
later tradition, sat is defined as that which is 
never sublated by some higher knowledge in 
past, present, or future (tri-kāla-abhādya). I am 
not aware of Śaṃkara or his followers using sat 
in the sense of “goodness”—certainly not “moral 
goodness”—in relation to Brahman. Nor, for that 
matter, am I aware of any passages in the 
Upaniṣads where sat could be construed in this 
way in relation to Brahman. When paired, sat 
and asat must invariably be translated as being 
and nonbeing; satya is contrasted with anṛta, as 
“truth and untruth.” The concern is 
predominantly ontological and epistemological, 
albeit within a wider axiological and 
soteriological framework. 
The word satya figures in the famous 
“definition” of Brahman found at Taittirīya 
Upaniṣad 2.1.1: satyaṃ jnanam anantam brahma 
(“Brahman is real, knowledge, infinite”). 
Śaṃkara glosses satyam as “not changing,” so 
that the verse comes out, through lakṣaṇārtha 
(proximate secondary predication), as a bit of 
negative theology, “Brahman is what is not 
changing, not unreal, not unconscious, not 
limited.”19 This negative theology, of course, 
finds its primary scriptural justification at 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6, “This Self is 
spoken of as, ‘Not thus, not thus’ (neti neti).” For 
Śaṃkara, this legitimates the ruthless 
discarding of limiting attributions (upādhi) in 
thinking about Brahman. 
There are any number of passages that point 
to Brahman as transcending all distinctions 
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(dvandvātīta), including what in English might be 
called the morally good and bad. Brahman, the 
Self, or the liberated sage (which are equivalent) 
are said in the Upaniṣads to be beyond both 
morality (dharma) and immorality (adharma), 
the desirable (priya) and the undesirable 
(apriya), good deeds (sukṛta) and bad (duṣkṛta), 
merit (puṇya) and sin (pāpa).20 Dramatically, 
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.22 declares: “There, 
a thief is not a thief, the murderer of a Brahmin 
is not a murderer of a Brahmin.” Given that 
Brahminicide is arguably the most heinous 
crime in this particular universe of meaning, 
this is a powerful statement indeed. 
In short, it would be hard to support any 
claim as to the moral goodness, or otherwise, of 
Brahman in classical Advaita.21 It seems clear 
that for this tradition Brahman is, as has often 
been said, “beyond good and evil.”22  
Nevertheless, there are several passages 
dealing with theodicy in the Brahmasūtra. In 
commenting on one of these Śaṃkara is forced 
to defend the goodness of Brahman, indeed the 
moral goodness of Brahman as a moral agent. 
What are we to make of this? 
Brahmasūtra 2.1.34 famously raises the 
question of whether Brahman, if regarded as the 
cause of the world, might be guilty of partiality 
(vaiṣamya) or even cruelty (nairghṛṇya) because 
of the different experiences and the suffering of 
his creatures. Śaṃkara rises to the defense of 
God in the face of his objector’s accusation that 
the Lord (īśvara) has created an unjust world 
(viṣamāṃ sṛṣṭim). “Owing to infliction of misery 
and destruction on all creatures,” Śaṃkara’s 
pūrvapakṣin, or objector, charges, “the Lord will 
be open to the charge of extreme cruelty, 
abhorred even by the wicked.”23 Here, it is clear 
that the Lord is being judged by external moral 
standards, ordinary human standards, as one 
would judge another human person. Śaṃkara 
accepts these terms, jumps into the fray, and 
defends the Lord. God, he says, cannot be 
accused of partiality or injustice because he is 
simply allotting to individuals the experiences 
they have earned by their karma.24  
It is significant, however, that in an earlier 
passage, commenting on Brahmasūtra 2.1.21-22, 
Śaṃkara had already taken the argument in 
quite a different direction. There, he defends 
Brahman against the charge of failing to do what 
is good, not with the argument that the divine 
allocates experience on the basis of individuals’ 
karma, but on the basis that Brahman does not 
really do anything at all: “The defects of not 
doing what is beneficial and so on cannot apply, 
because [for Brahman] there is nothing 
beneficial (hita) to be done nor harmful (ahita) to 
be avoided, since Brahman is eternally liberated 
by nature.” Śaṃkara makes clear that in this 
context he is talking from the paramārtika 
viewpoint, the perspective of absolute truth, in 
which the “creatorhood of Brahman” 
(brahmaṇas sraṣṭṛtvam) has been “sublated by 
right knowledge,” along with all “dualistic 
dealings, brought about by false ignorance.” He 
continues: “Then, in that state, where can 
creation come from, and from where such 
defects as the failure to do that which is 
beneficial?” In short, he is saying that the 
supreme, nirguṇa Brahman is not accountable to 
any human standards, that indeed, Brahman, in 
itself, is neither a creator nor an agent of any 
action. From this point of view, the problem of 
unjust suffering in the world is easily solved: 
“From the absolute perspective,” Śaṃkara 
writes, “saṃsāra does not exist” (saṃsāro na tu 
paramārthato ‘sti).25 
My conclusion: Śaṃkara is willing to 
champion the moral goodness of Brahman, or 
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Īśvara, at a provisional—could we say 
analogical?—level of discourse, pertaining to the 
apara (lower) or saguṇa (qualified) Brahman. 
However, he would emphatically deny any 
conceptualization of moral goodness (or 
depravity) in relation to the supreme or para 
Brahman. 
Abhinavagupta and Kashmir Śaivism 
The Śaiva nondualism of Kashmir, as 
articulated most prominently by the great 
polymath Abhinavagupta, is a different sort of 
nondualism than Śaṃkara’s Advaita. It could be 
called a nondualism by inclusion, since the 
world is celebrated as contained within the 
Divine, rather than a nondualism by exclusion, 
which achieves unity by dismissing the world. 
(Recall Śaṃkara’s assertion, just above, of the 
ultimate non-existence of saṃsāra.) This could 
be termed a cosmic monism, as opposed to the 
classical Advaitin’s acosmic monism. For 
Abhinava, the concept of a static, completely 
transcendent absolute contradicts the glorious 
independence (svātantrya) of the Lord to 
manifest at will a world that is not different 
from himself as, to use an analogy commonly 
employed in the tradition, images are not 
different from the mirror in which they appear. 
The Kashmir Śaiva adept correspondingly exults 
in her or his complete identity with God.   
While concern is expressed—sometimes in 
quite dramatic terms—that the “secrets” of 
Śaiva teaching are not be revealed to those who 
are sinful (pāpa) or devoid of morality (dharma-
hīna),26 those teachings, especially the secret 
ones, are unabashedly transmoral—and in some 
cases famously transgressive. If discussion of 
conventional ethical concerns is infrequent in 
Śaṃkara, it is even more difficult to find in 
Abhinavagupta’s Śaivism. Indeed—as is well 
known—those adhering to ordinary morality are 
compared to “sheep” (paśu),27 in contrast with 
the spiritual elect, who are termed heroes (vīra). 
This is a complex tradition with multiple 
streams. One place of entrée is the prominent 
identification in Kashmir Śaivism of Paramaśiva, 
the supreme Śiva, as Bhairava, the “Frightful” or 
“Horrific.”28 Abhinavagupta is regarded by 
tradition as an incarnation of Bhairava, and he 
is said to have departed from this world by 
entering into the Bhairava-guhā, “Bhairava’s 
cave,” not far from Srinagar, reciting the 
Bhairava Stava, a hymn (said to be his own 
composition) to the Deity in that form.29 An 
important conceptualization of liberation in this 
tradition is as bhairavaikātmya, “identity with 
Bhairava.”30 
Now, prior to and to a real extent even after 
this Deity’s adoption by Kashmir Śaiva Brahmins 
as a primary symbol of the ultimate, Bhairava 
was a terrifying God, associated with “the 
ascetic cremation-ground culture of heterodox 
and transgressive groups who sought power 
through control of and possession by hordes of 
frightening goddesses.”31 Bhairava encompasses 
with his horrific, fanged appearance and 
associations the religion of the tantric vīra, the 
hero who laughs at the pain and suffering of this 
world, seeing it as a product of ignorance. 
Suffering can be “devoured,” or transformed by 
the power of supreme consciousness, with 
which the adept has identified. In his “Hymns in 
Imitation of Bhairava” (Bhairavānukaraṇastava), 
Abhinava’s disciple Kṣemarāja praises Bhairava 
thus: “Lord! By wearing bones and the rosary 
made of hands and heads, and shining with the 
human blood, you instruct that the world is pure 
because it is of the nature of Brahman.”32 
As is well-known, this attitude toward the 
world was ritualized in the secret, transgressive 
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rites described in Abhinava’s Tantrāloka 29 and 
elsewhere. This approach aims at a 
consciousness “free of the contraction of laws, 
untouched by injunction or prohibition.”33 In 
the end, it seeks what Sanderson has called a 
“mystic vision of fearless omnipotence.”34 The 
practitioner identifies with Svacchanda 
Bhairava, the “Lord of the vīras” (vīra-nāyaka), 
the God who “devours everything” (sarva-
bhakṣa).35 
God’s responsibility for the joy and suffering 
of creatures is not here avoided or denied; 
rather, it is celebrated. Bhairava is described in 
the Bahurūpagarbha Stotra, a section of the 
Svacchanda Tantra, as the “bestower of the 
experience of the terrifying saṃsāra” (ghora-
saṃsāra-saṃbhoga-dāyine). He is the one who 
“bestows exceedingly terrible experiences in 
saṃsāra” (ghora-ghora-saṃsāra-dayine).36 The 
Stavacintāmaṇi declares that God’s power 
(sāmarthya) is sufficient to allot worldly 
experiences and liberation to individuals 
without dependence on any external factor 
whatsoever (ananyāpekṣa).37 Doniger’s 
observation that “in Hinduism, evil (like good) is 
an integral part of God and stems from him”38 
certainly applies to nondual Saivism.  
Śaivism in Bali 
In exploring some examples of religious 
outlooks that do not insist on the moral 
goodness of the Supreme Being, it is worth a 
short excursus on the Hinduism of Bali. There, 
as earlier in Java, a pre-Abhinavagupta form of 
Saivism took root and, though today under 
multiple threats political and otherwise, still 
flourishes, in ritual expressions especially, but 
also in secret texts, the lontars, preserved by 
village Brahmins.39 
In a thought-provoking article entitled “Is 
God Evil?” the anthropologist Mark Hobart 
describes a conversation with Balinese 
informants: 
Late one evening after a long discussion 
with a group of villagers, in which they 
commented on how many contradictions 
and inconsistencies their beliefs seemed to 
contain, I remarked that we too had our 
puzzles. In Christianity there was a paradox 
that, if God were good, omnipotent and 
omniscient, how could evil exist? To my 
surprise I was met with hoots of laughter. 
White people seemed so clever. How could 
they find difficult what was so obvious, even 
to simple villagers who could not read or 
write? One of them explained the matter to 
me, to mutters of agreement from the 
others. Of course God—in Bali Sang Hyang 
Widi, the highest, all-embracing Divinity—
was bad (kaon). How else could there be bad 
in the world?40 
The idea that the Deity can manifest in 
terrible forms is of course well attested in India 
itself. I might venture to say, however, based on 
my own informal experience in both India and 
Indonesia, that the Balinese on the whole 
remain more readily disposed to embrace such 
conceptions than contemporary Hindus. It is 
well-known in Balinese lore that God has a 
wrathful (pemurtian) aspect.41 The ambivalent 
nature of God in Bali has been explored in 
several interesting articles by Michelle Stephen, 
who undertook a study of myths of Śiva and Umā 
recorded in Balinese manuscripts. She 
concluded that these texts “revealed nothing 
less than that all destructive and dangerous 
forces in the world originate from the divine 
pair themselves, and that the aim of human 
6
Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 29 [2016], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.butler.edu/jhcs/vol29/iss1/3
DOI: 10.7825/2164-6279.1626
10 Lance Nelson 
ritual is primarily to cause these destructive 
forces to return to their original benign 
condition.”42 
Conclusion 
In these remarks, I have not intended to 
address theodicy or propose any new 
“solutions” that might save anyone’s faith from 
the atheists’ argument from evil. Nevertheless, I 
hope what I have said will make a modest 
contribution to the discussion by raising a 
particular, limited question regarding that 
argument. If proponents of atheism, whether 
new or old, think that they have dealt religion a 
fatal blow using an argument that assumes that 
theists universally suppose that God is (morally) 
good, they are ignoring the wider evidence. If 
believers, on the other hand, feel their faith 
threatened by such arguments, it may be that a 
broader conception of God’s goodness is called 
for. As McCabe suggests, there is always a 
chance, “We may find, as Job did, that it was our 
own view of God that was infantile, [and thus] 
we may in fact come to a deeper understanding 
of the mystery of God.”43  
I have found the distinction between the 
atheist argument from evil and the reflective—
or aporetic44—problem of evil to be most helpful.  
The latter seems not so much a threat to 
faith as a question for contemplative struggle, at 
least to the extent that it focuses the mind on 
the mysteries of life and God. 
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